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GUTTER POLITICS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
INTRODUCTION
"Dirty" election tactics have been a feature of American political
life almost from the beginning:' Jefferson was called an immoral
atheist, Lincoln a drunkard.' This tradition has continued; violent
anti-Catholic propaganda was an unfortunate part of the 1960 presidential
campaign.' Mudslinging, smears and outright falsehoods are a feature
of far too many campaigns.'
All states have laws regulating the conduct of elections; contained
in these statutes are provisions which relate directly to the issue of
"dirty" campaign tactics. The constitutionality of many of these provi-
sions has been placed in question in the light of a decade of Supreme Court
decisions expanding the scope of protection of freedom of speech and
press.' To focus the discussion, the following description of events in a
fictional election campaign is presented both to illustrate the scope of the
legislation in question and to establish the real-life context from which a
judicial contest would arise.
The Thirteenth Ward Elects an Alderman
The aldermanic election in Gotham City's Thirteenth Ward was one
of the most viciously fought campaigns in the history of that city's
politics. Incumbent Alderman Mac Kinley was challenged by William
Bryan Jennings. During the campaign, Jennings charged that the incum-
bent had voted in favor of increasing real estate taxes. He accused Kinley
of having taken a bribe to vote in favor of granting a liquor license
1. B. FELKNOR, DiRTY POLITICS 18 (1966).
2. Id. at 26. Mr. Felknor further states:
The coarse epithets applied to Mr. Lincoln were remarkable both in volume
and in viciousness. . . . The quickest summary is a negative one: Lincoln
was not called a ladies' man and none of the slanderous smear words that
gained wide circulation throughout the Union began with the letters Q,
X, Y or Z.
Otherwise every letter of the alphabet was called into play against the
wartime President.
Id.
3. T. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1960 251 (1961).
4. Bruce Felknor is the former Executive Secretary of the Fair Campaign
Practices Committee. His book, Dirty Politics, is a valuable source for anyone interested
in this subject.
5. The primary cases of importance for this discussion are Mills v. Alabama, 384
U.S. 214 (1966); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); and Talley v.
California, 362 U.S. 116 (1960).
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and of being a tool of the downtown business interests. Finally, he
charged that the Alderman had been "hauled into court for beating his
wife." As a matter of fact, Kinley had voted against the tax increase.
He had never taken any bribes and had never been charged with "beating
his wife." Naturally, he vigorously denied that he was anyone's "tool."
Mike Hanna, Kinley's campaign manager, responded to these charges
by stating at a League of Women Voters candidates' meeting that
Jennings' charges were absolutely false and probably "the product of a
desperate and deranged mind." Hanna further charged that if Jennings
were elected he would be the Mayor's puppet because "he can't even
decide whether to have eggs or pancakes for breakfast without asking
for someone else's permission."
During the week preceding the election, a circular was distributed
in two blue-collar precincts that had given a large number of votes to
George Wallace in 1968. The circular praised Kinley for his sponsorship
of open housing legislation and for his civil rights work. The circular was
prepared as if it were a Kinley campaign piece intended to be distributed
in black precincts only. The circular, which was unsigned, had been
prepared and distributed by the Jennings campaign committee.
On election day, an editorial appeared on the front page of the
Westside Shopper (a weekly newspaper which was delivered free in the
Thirteenth Ward and which normally consisted primarily of advertise-
ments for local businesses). The editorial urged the voters to elect
Jennings (who was the editor's brother-in-law) and stated that if
Kinley were reelected he would vote in favor of moving 700 low income
black families into the ward.
On election day, the Jennings campaign committee was out in full
force. Two or three workers were in front of every polling place with
placards saying "Jennings for Alderman." They distributed a circular
which claimed in large print: "Alderman Kinley has just been indicted
for income tax fraud !" This charge, like many others, was false.
After the votes were counted, Jennings was declared the winner
with a margin of seventeen votes out of a total of six thousand cast.6
The defeated incumbent promptly brought a suit contesting the results of
6. The hypothetical election was made deliberately close so that any of the
incidents described could have changed the outcome. Close elections, especially on the
local level, are quite common in many areas. In 1969, Minneapolis Alderman Richard
Curtin was reelected by nine votes. In 1962, Minnesota's gubernatorial election was
finally decided 133 days after the election when a recount of every ballot cast gave the
winner a 91 vote margin out of a total vote cast of 1,267,507. The margin, stated as a
percentage, was .007 percent. For a description of the recount see R. STINNET & C.
BACKSTROm, RECOUNT (1964).
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the election, claiming that Jennings and his campaign committee had
violated three separate provisions of the state's Corrupt Campaign Prac-
tices Act by distributing anonymous campaign literature, making false
and libelous charges and by soliciting votes on election day. In addition to
the election contest, misdemeanor charges were brought against the
incumbent's campaign manager for having made false statements during
the campaign and against the editor of the Westside Shopper for soliciting
votes on election day.
Kinley's campaign manager contended that his statements did not
violate the state law because he was merely expressing an opinion. The
newspaper editor and Jennings argued that the state laws they were
charged with violating were an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom
of speech and press.
The issues presented by these defenses could be analyzed as an
abstract, rarefied constitutional question. However, an election campaign
is far from being an unlimited marketplace of ideas. A campaign is an
attempt to sell a candidate to the voters in a tightly circumscribed time
frame. The campaign comes to an abrupt end on election day; when a
ballot is cast, the marketplace is closed. It will be suggested that the
constitutionality of state election laws must be considered in the real-life
context of a close and bitterly fought campaign. Provisions which might
be considered restrictions on free speech in a theoretical marketplace of
ideas may well serve to encourage responsible public debate in the context
of a campaign.
Election Laws-An Overview
Before beginning consideration of the questions presented above,
it is necessary to place the discussion in a further context: the peculiarly
local nature of election campaigns and election laws. Each state has its
own political traditions, myths and customs.' Election laws reflect these
local differences. Each state, as well as the federal government, has
undertaken by legislation to regulate the conduct of elections and cam-
paigns. Some of these provisions might seem to be capricious or un-
reasonable when considered in the abstract, but they are usually quite
reasonable responses to local problems. For example, Minnesota, whose
political history is characterized by third party political movements and
mergers between parties,8 has a law which prohibits a new political
7. See generally J. FENTON, MIDWEST POLITICS (1966) ; J. FENTON, POLITICS
IN THE BORDER STATES (1957); D. LOCKARD, NEW ENGLAND POLITICS (1959) ; POLITICS
IN THE AMERICAN WEST (F. Jonas ed. 1969).
8. G.T. MITAU, POLITICS IN MINNESOTA 64 (2d ed. 1970). For example, the
1972]
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party from adopting as its name any part of the name of an existing
political party.' Other examples could be given by any observer familiar
with the politics of his own home state.
Laws regulating the conduct of campaigns are generally responses
to local problems and a reflection of community standards. Such statutes
are usually entitled "Corrupt" or "Unfair Campaign Practice Acts."
While it is difficult to generalize about the content of these acts, three
types of provisions are common: 1) regulation of financial contribu-
tions and expenditures; 2) prohibition of what might best be termed
"corrupt practices;" and 3) regulation of what can be categorized as
unfair campaign practices.
The financial provisions, which are vitally important to the candidate,
have been discussed at great length elsewhere.' Statutes governing
"corruption" (bribery, misconduct of election officials, vote fraud, etc.)
might best be considered as "true crimes." These statutes raise problems
which are common to criminal law and procedure in general and are
outside the scope of this discussion.
Unfair campaign practice statutes incorporate restrictions on a
variety of campaign activities and tactics. It is restrictions of this type
which were illustrated in the hypothetical which forms the basis for this
note. All states have provisions regulating election day activities. Most
have provisions requiring that political advertising be labeled and some
have provisions regulating the content of such advertising. These laws
are a reaction to local experience with "gutter" politics. It will be
suggested that, for the most part, these provisions place only minimal
restrictions on freedom of expression and serve an important function
by protecting the individual voter and by encouraging responsible public
debate.
ELECTION DAY CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
All states have laws regulating what kind of campaigning can be
Democratic Party in Minnesota is known as the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party or
DFL. It came into existence as the result of a merger in 1944.
9. MINN. STAT. § 203.32(2) (1962). Thus, the political party which is known
nationally as the Socialist Labor Party appears on the ballot in Minnesota as the
Industrial Government Party because another "Socialist" party pre-existed them in the
state.
10. See, e.g., D. ADAMNY, FINANCING POLITICS (1969); H. ALEXANDER, REGULA-
TION OF POLITICAL FINANCE (1966); COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, FINANC-
ING A BETTER ELECTION SYSTEM (1968) ; A. HEARD, THE COSTS OF DEMOCRACY (1960);
Lobel, Federal Control of Campaign Contributions, 51 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1966) ; Mitau,
Welected Aspects of Centralized and Decentralized Control over Campaign Finance:
A Commentary on S. 636, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 620 (1956) ; Rodgers, A Model Bill on the
Reporting of Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, 23 VAND. L. REV. 293 (1970).
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done on election day. These laws range in strictness from those which
simply prohibit the solicitation of votes within a polling place to those
which absolutely prohibit any election day campaign activity. These laws
reflect the varying community standards for campaigning. In some states,
advertising on behalf of political candidates is heard constantly throughout
election day on every radio and television station without significant
community protest. In contrast, in Minnesota, a rather innocuous "get-
out-the-vote" message sponsored by the Democratic National Committee
on national television in 1964 created a substantial controversy when it
was broadcast inadvertently on a Minneapolis television station.11
The most restrictive form of these laws is represented by a North
Dakota statute:
Any person asking, soliciting, or in any manner trying to
induce or persuade, any voter on election day to vote or refrain
from voting for any candidate or the candidates of any
political party or organization, or any measure submitted to
the people shall be punished by a fine of not less than five
dollars nor more than one hundred dollars for the first offense. 2
Three other states have statutes which absolutely prohibit election day
campaign activities. 8
These statutes, one of which has already been declared uncon-
stitutional in part, 4 raise substantial first amendment questions. How-
ever, even the least restrictive form of state regulation in this area
can be the subject of controversy. For example, a provision of the
Arizona election law prohibits campaigning on election day within fifty
feet of the polling place.'" In State v. Robles,8 the Arizona Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of this statute and stated that the
purpose of the provision was
to prevent interference with the efficient handling of the voters
by the election board and to prevent delay or intimidation of
voters entering the polling place by political workers seeking
a last chance to change their votes.'
11. Minneapolis Star, Nov. 3, 1964, § B, at 4, col. 3.
12. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16-20-19 (1960).
13. ALA. CODE tit. 17, § 260.350 (1959); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 94-1453
(1969) ; ORE. REv. STAT. § 260.350 (1969).
14. The Alabama statute was declared unconstitutional in part in Mills v.
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966). See note 23 infra and accompanying text.
15. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-862 (1956).
16. 88 Ariz. 253, 355 P.2d 895 (1960).
17. Id. at 256-57, 355 P.2d at 897.
1972]
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In a later case, Fish v. Redeker, 8 a violation of the same provision by a
candidate for Republician Precinct Committeewoman was the basis for
challenging her election to the position under a separate provision pro-
viding for contesting elections. 9 The court cited Robles upholding the
constitutionality of this provision and held that Mrs. Fish's conduct did
violate the statute. The court, however, refused to void her election,
stating that "while appellant's conduct at the polling place is not to be
condoned, it does not come within the statutory definition of grounds for
any election contest."2 According to the court's interpretation of the
election contest statute, this offense was not one that could be used to bar
a successful candidate from office. It is clear, however, that since Arizona
law does make this offense a misdemeanor, 1 the new committeewoman
could have been prosecuted for this violation.
Restrictions on campaigning in or near polling places are designed
to promote more efficient handling of elections and perhaps to allow the
voter to make his choice in peace. Polling place restrictions seem to be a
reasonable and necessary part of a state election code. They do not raise
the constitutional issues that are presented by statutes such as the North
Dakota statute quoted above" which prohibits all election day campaign
activities. For example, the Alabama Corrupt Practices Act, in part,
forbids a person "to do any electioneering or to solicit any votes . . . on
the day on which the election . . . is being held."'" In 1962, a newspaper
editor was convicted of violating this provision for having published an
election day editorial urging the voters of Birmingham to vote in favor
of a proposal for a mayor-council form of government. The Alabama
Supreme Court upheld the conviction, 4 ruling that publication of the
editorial clearly violated the law and that the statute was not unconstitu-
tional because "the restriction, everything considered, is within the field
of reasonableness."" The United States Supreme Court reversed in
Mills v. Alabama,' stating that "no test of reasonableness can save a
state law from invalidation as a violation of the First Amendment when
that law makes it a crime for a newspaper to do no more than urge the
18. 2 Ariz. App. 602, 411 P.2d 40 (1966).
19. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-1201 (1956).
20. 2 Ariz. App. at 606, 411 P.2d at 44.
21. "Any person violating any provision of the fifty-foot limit notice is guilty
of a misdemeanor." ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-862(c) (1956).
22. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
23. ALA. CODE tit. 17, § 285 (1959).
24. State v. Mills, 278 Ala. 188, 176 So. 2d 884 (1965).
25. Id. at 195, 176 So. 2d at 890.
26. 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
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people to vote one way or another in a publicly held election."27
The Court does not give a clear indication of how far its ruling
extends. It could be used to strike down all restrictions on election day
activities.2 However, even if the holding is limited to newspaper editorials
on election day, certain real-life problems are ignored. Advertisements
and campaign literature must be prepared by campaign committees before
the day on which they are to be printed or distributed. The newspaper
editor is not restricted in this way. Having the shortest press deadline,
the editor has the right to make the last charge, comment or rebuttal.28
It is obvious that a partisan editor in a one newspaper town could take
unfair advantage of this special privilege.
The Mills case, however, is probably not limited to newspaper
editorials. It is clear that the absolute prohibition type statutes do suffer
from a problem of overbreadth ° and from the possibility of selective
enforcement. Such statutes would seem to prohibit the informal "friends
and neighbors" type of campaigning that is natural on election day. They
raise the possibility of prosecution arising out of an innocent conversa-
tion between two voters or between a candidate and a voter. Strict
observance of the letter of the law might require all bumper stickers to be
removed on election evening. The "absolute prohibition" statutes, there-
fore, do seem to have the chilling effect on first amendment freedoms that
the Court in Mills was concerned with.
The effect of Mills on other election day restrictions is not clear.
The Court did seem to recognize that the polling place restrictions were
valid, commenting that "[t]his question in no way involves the extent
of the state's power to regulate conduct in and around the polls in order
to maintain peace, order and decorum there."'"
The question of what restrictions can be placed on election day
campaign activities beyond mere polling place restrictions remains open.
Four states32 have more than mere polling place restrictions but stop
short of prohibiting all election day activities.2 All prohibit electioneering
27. Id. at 220.
28. The Wisconsin Attorney General is of the opinion that Mills does strike down
all prohibitions on election day activities. 55 Wis. ATT'y GEN. Op. 133 (1966).
29. If this is indeed the case, it might be relevant to paraphrase George Orwell's
Animal Farm and say, "All citizens are equal, except newspaper editors, who are more
equal."
30. For a fuller discussion of this doctrine see Note, The First Amendment
Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844 (1970).
31. 384 U.S. at 218.
32. Kansas, Minnesota, South Dakota and Wisconsin.
33. In addition to these four, Florida has a statute prohibiting the distribution
of literature "against a candidate" on election day. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.35 (1960).
1972]
et al.: Gutter Politics and the First Amendment
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1972
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
within a certain distance of the polling place. 4 In addition, all four pro-
hibit any paid newspaper, radio or television advertising,8" and Minnesota
prohibits a candidate or his committee from distributing literature on
election day. 6 It should be pointed out that none of these statutes would
prohibit a newspaper editorial or any newsgathering functions of the
press. The Minnesota statute states:
Any person who shall at any place on the day of any primary
or election broadcast by television or radio any material in-
tended or which tends to influence the voting at any election
or to circulate or distribute, or cause to be distributed any
candidates' cards, campaign cards, placards or campaign litera-
ture of any kind shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."'
This provision has been interpreted to prohibit newspaper advertising
on election day,"8 but apparently the question of editorials has never been
raised. It has been held that this section does not prohibit a candidate
or his campaign committee from soliciting votes in person or by telephone
as long as the solicitation is done more than one hundred feet from the
polling place. 8
Prohibiting literature distribution, as the Minnesota statute does,
raises a question discussed by the Supreme Court in Lovell v. City of
Griffin.4" In that case, a Griffin, Georgia, city ordinance prohibited
distribution of circulars or pamphlets without a license from the city
manager. The Court held that the ordinance was void on its face as an
abridgement of freedom of the press which "necessarily embraces
pamphlets and leaflets."'" The Court further stated:
The ordinance cannot be saved because it relates to distribution
and not to publication. "Liberty of circulation is as essential to
that freedom as liberty of publishing; indeed without circula-
tion, the publication would be of little value."42
A broad reading of Mills and Lovell would strike down the "intermediate"
34. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-179 (1964); MINN. STAT. § 211.15(1) (1962); S.
D. CODE § 12-18-3 (1967); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 12.13 (1967).
35. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1702 (1964); MINN. STAT. § 211.15(2) (1962); S.D.
CODE § 12-25-10 (1967); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 12.13 (1967).
36. MINN. STAT. § 211.15(2) (1962).
37. Id.
38. 1948 MINN. Arr'y GEN. Op. 627-K-5.
39. 1929 MINN. Ar'ey GEN. Op. 627-H.
40. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
41. Id. at 452.
42. Id., quoting Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877).
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statutes such as Minnesota's as well as those statutes which absolutely
prohibit election day campaigning. Careful consideration of the policy
underlying these statutes indicates that they serve a valid function and
the "intermediate" type, at least, should be upheld. It would seem that
these statutes arise from a legislative intent to prohibit formal campaign-
ing on election day." Three reasons can be advanced in support of such
a prohibition. The first is to lessen the likelihood that last minute charges
and countercharges will determine the outcome of the election by
providing the voter with a "cooling off" period before he casts his vote.
The second is to lessen the likelihood of undue influence on the voter on
election day. The third is to promote the dignity of the election process
and decorum in election day activities. These reasons will be discussed
individually in detail.
The "Cooling Off" Period
It is probably impossible to know with absolute certainty what
effect the last minute "smear" has on the results of an election. It has been
observed that "[t]he explanations offered for electoral results are
astonishingly varied; they depend typically on the slenderest evidence,
and disagreements are commonplace even among knowledgeable
observers."" Nevertheless, it is certain that the "smear" will affect some
voters, and less well-known candidates for local officers are particularly
vulnerable. This is true because the voter is perhaps only vaguely aware
of the local candidate and has not been able to form a definite impression
of the candidate from television or radio appearances.
The Alabama Supreme Court, in upholding the conviction of the
newspaper editor in State v. Mills, 3 reasoned that the purpose of the
statute was to protect "the public from confusive [sic] last-minute
charges and counter-charges."4 The United States Supreme Court felt
that this argument had a fatal flaw.
The state statute leaves people free to hurl their campaign
charges up to the last minute of the day before the election
then goes on to make it a crime to answer those last
charges on election day, the only time that they can be effec-
tively answered.""
43. Legislative histories for most state statutes are non-existent, of course. The
reasons advanced are a synthesis from the state court cases that are cited in this section.
44. A. CAMPBELL, P. CoNvERsE, D. SToicEs & W. MI.LER, THE AMERICAN VOTER
523 (1960).
45. 278 Ala. 188, 176 So. 2d 884 (1965).
46. Id. at 195-96, 176 So. 2d at 890.
47. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
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It is obvious that, as a practical fact, there is a cut-off point. A
rebuttal after the polls have closed is worthless to the candidate and of
very little value to the voter. The problem with the Court's view that
forbidding electioneering forbids rebuttal which should be allowed is the
difficulty of drafting a statute which will allow only rebuttal on election
day. It would be almost impossible to allow rebuttal without allowing
new charges and countercharges. It is difficult in any case to answer a
charge made on election eve and impossible to answer one made on
election day. Since campaign literature and advertisements must be
printed or prepared before the day on which they are to be distributed,
the "Monday night smear" can only be answered in the news columns of
the daily paper or on radio and television news programs. This can, in
fact, be done, since none of these statutes prohibits the news media from
reporting the news on election day. If new charges are made on election
day, no rebuttal is possible. Therefore, prohibiting election day election-
eering still provides an avenue for rebuttal while preventing new and
unanswerable charges.
The Supreme Court, however, felt that a legislative motive in
enacting this type of statute-a desire to prevent last-minute smears-
was irrelevant to the constitutionality of the law." It is submitted that,
as a practical matter, it should be relevant. The last-minute charge cannot
be prevented, but its impact can be lessened.1 The distinguished political
scientist, V. 0. Key, Jr., wrote:
[V]oters are not fools. To be sure, many individual voters
act in odd ways indeed; yet in the large the electorate behaves
about as rationally and responsibly as we should expect, given
the clarity of the alternatives presented to it. 9
It is probable that most voters suspect last-minute charges. A brief time
of reflection will allow this suspicion to take effect. The charge will
be placed in its proper perspective.
The "intermediate" type statute does not, in any substantive sense,
supress freedom of expression, but simplv reouires a one-day moratorium
on formal political campaigning. It would seem entirely reasonable for
a state legislature to decide that the electorate should have a short
"cooling off" period in which to make its decision. It may not affect
many votes, but it should be apparent that last-minute smears are most
48. Id.
49. V.0. KEY, JR., THE RESPONSIBLE ELECTORATE 7 (1966). The same point was
made in a more colloquial manner by Scammon and Wattenberg. "Voters are not
Nitwits." R. SCAMmON & B. WATTENBERG, THE REAL MAJORITY 205 (1970).
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common in close elections where a few votes may decide the issue.
Returning for a moment to the hypothetical presented at the begin-
ning of this article will serve to illustrate this point. The voter reads,
just before walking into the polling place, that the incumbent has been
indicted for income tax fraud. He may be persuaded to vote against the
incumbent for that reason alone. On the other hand, if he had read the
same charge on the night before the election, it may not be the deciding
factor. If he watches the news on television and no mention is made of
the alleged indictment or there is no story about it in the morning paper,
he may well decide that the charge was a fraud. Perhaps his natural
distrust of last-minute charges will assert itself. At any rate, the voter has
time to view the charge in some perspective. Indeed, the voter is not a
fool and should be allowed the right to make up his mind in a brief
period of privacy without being bombarded by propaganda.
Undue Influence of Voters
Prohibition of formal campaign activities on election day will tend
to lessen the possibilities of bribery, intimidation and undue influence of
voters. Two examples may be helpful in illustrating this point. Columnist
Mike Royko has reported the following election day incident:
On the third floor of a sagging building he [the Republican
precinct captain] found a couple who had not yet voted.
"I'd appreciate it if you voted for Friedman [a candidate
for Mayor of Chicago in 1971]" he said, offering a piece of
campaign literature.
The man hardly glanced at it and asked: "You givin'
dollars ?"
"No," Godbald [the precinct captain] said.
"The other fellows, they givin' dollars" the man said.
Stomping angrily down the steps, Godbald said, "See?
You know how many times I've heard that? Six or seven
times today.""
The second illustration comes from Edward Costikyan's account5'
of his campaign for reelection as a New York Assembly District Leader
as a "reform" Democrat. On the day of the election, the "regulars"
flooded the district with campaigners from other areas. Every street
corner was filled with literature distributors. The district "took on the
50. Royko, Daley Election Machine Grinds Fine, Minneapolis Star, Apr. 8, 1971,
§ D, at 3, col. 1.
51. E. COSTIKYAN, BEHIND CLOSED DOORs 339-43 (1966).
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aura of occupied territory." 2 Costikyan reports that it was the only
time in his political life that he was really frightened.
By eight o'clock it was quite dark, and the doorways of
closed shops were filled with silent huddling figures. Walking
to the polls was a scary experience for the voters, as many
of them told me."
Certainly, all states have laws prohibiting bribery and intimidation
of voters. But these offenses are hard to prove. How could anyone be
arrested for "intimidating a voter" while merely standing on a street
corner handing out campaign literature? How many people will testify
that they were bribed?
A prohibition of formal campaign activities will not prevent such
incidents, but it will make them less likely to happen. Most campaign
workers will not go out campaigning without literature." To effectively
influence voters, the worker will have to be visibly "soliciting votes"-
intimidation or bribery may not be as easy to see. In any case, a state
legislature should have the discretion to decide that the individual voter
has the right to go to the polls on election day without being harassed
or intimidated by political workers.
Dignity and Decorum in the Electoral Process
Prohibition of formal campaigning on election day would tend to
promote the dignity and decorum of the process of electing our public
officials. Elections are the fundamental basis for a democratic society.
It has been observed that
[p] residential elections constitute decisions of fundamental
significance in the democratic process. The trooping of millions
to the polls symbolizes self-rule and legitimatizes the authority
of government. But beyond such mystical functions of the
electoral process, elections are pivotal decisions which in turn
control many lesser determinations made in the name of the
people. 
5
Although this observation was made of presidential elections, it can be
52. Id. at 339.
53. Id. at 340.
54. Any experienced campaigner can testify to the difficulty of campaigning
without literature. One can walk up to a stranger on the street or knock on a stranger's
door to give him a piece of literature and then start a conversation. It is almost impos-
sible just to walk up to someone and say, "Vote for my man."
55. V.O. KEY, JR., POLITICS, PARTIES & PREssuRE GROUPS 542-43 (5th ed. 1964).
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applied with equal validity to any election. The process by which the
American people legitimatize their government has two phases, the
campaign and the casting of ballots.
As to the first phase, the "three-ring circus" aspects of American
campaigns are unmatched anywhere in the world. The hurly-burly of the
campaign is an entertaining spectacle that is perhaps a reflection of the
American character.5" Many observers feel that it serves an important
function. "There is great value in a system that somehow demands that
a candidate get sweaty and dirty and exhausted. . . The successful
candidate in America must touch the people, figuratively and literally." 5 7
In contrast to the campaign, however, election day is a day of
decision. Polling place restrictions alone cannot be entirely effective in
preventing disruption of the electoral process. Campaign workers can
harass voters just as well outside the polling place as within it. Sound
trucks can make a political message penetrate into the voting booth
itself. Fifty or one hundred foot limits only move the harassment back
from the door of the polling place and, as a practical matter, enforcement
of these limitations requires having someone outside the polling place
"shooing" campaign workers back across the statutory line. The voter
should not be forced to battle his way through competing groups of
campaign workers and poll watchers to get into the polling place.
Once election day has arrived, the formal phase of the election ritual
has begun. It would seem entirely proper, therefore, for a state legislature
to attempt to give a sense of dignity to the process of casting a vote by
silencing for a few hours the roar of the three-ring circus.
Prohibiting Formal Campaigning on Election Day
The state does have a compelling interest in preserving the integrity
of the electoral process. To this end, it should be able to prohibit formal
campaigning on election day." For the reasons advanced above, these
restrictions should be allowed to extend not only to activities near the
polling place but also to the distribution of literature as well as to radio,
56. R. ScAMMON & B. WATTENBERG, THE REAL MAJORITY 218 (1970).
57. Id. at 217.
58. This would mean, as it does in Minnesota, that election day activities would
be limited to "get out the vote" telephone campaigns.
It should be noted that these laws do not affect voter turnout. In the 1960 Presiden-
tial election, three of the top ten states in percentage of eligible voters participating
in the election had either absolute or intermediate prohibition type laws. All of the
non-southern states with these provisions had more than a 70 percent turnout-which is
above the national average. R. Scammon, The Electoral Process, 27 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROD. 303 (1962). Most observers feel that high turnout is associated with high interest,
involvement and information. W. FLANIGAN, POLITIcAL BEHAVIOR OF THE AMERICAN
EmAEc25 (1968).
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televison and newspaper advertising. Such restrictions, enacted to protect
the individual voter and to foster a more orderly and dignified electoral
process, would appear to be reasonable and to have no chilling effect on
freedom of expression.
ANONYMOUS CAMPAIGN LITERATURE
Forty-one states and the federal government " have laws, frequently
referred to as disclosure statutes, which prohibit the distribution of
anonymous campaign literature. The Oregon disclosure statute is re-
presentative:
No person shall write, print, publish, post or circulate or cause
to be written, printed, published, posted or circulated through
the mails or otherwise any letter, circular, bill, placard, poster
or other publication relating to any election unless it bears on
its face the name and address of the author and publisher
thereof."0
Other statutes require that the literature bear "the name of the candidate
in whose behalf the same is published"'" or that of the "person"0 2 who
is responsible for it. These statutes are designed to prevent the "gutter
flyer" which has been defined as "the lowest variety of political literature,
vicious and not traceable, always disavowed."0 3
Disclosure statutes have been held constitutional by state courts in
the past. 4 Their current status, however, may be in question as the result
of the United States Supreme Court decision in Talley v. California."5
Talley did not specifically involve election literature, but rather was
concerned with a Los Angeles City Ordinance which prohibited cir-
culation of any handbills that did not have the name and address of the
author printed on them. The Court reasoned that "there can be no doubt
that such an identification requirement would tend to restrict freedom to
distribute information and thereby freedom of expression,"00 and there-
fore held that the ordinance was unconstitutional.
59. 18 U.S.C. § 612 (1966).
60. ORE. REV. STAT. § 260.360 (1969).
61. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211.08 (Supp. 1971).
62. CAL. ELECTIONS CODE § 12047 (West Supp. 1971).
63. W. SAFIPR, THE NEW LANGUAGE OF POLITICS (1968).
64. See, e.g., Finley v. State, 28 Ala. App. 151, 181 So. 123 (1922); State v.
Freeman, 143 Kan. 315, 55 P.2d 362 (1936) ; Commonwealth v. Evans, 156 Pa. Super.
321, 40 A.2d 137 (1944).
65. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
66. Id. at 64.
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In United States v. Scott, 7 a federal district court held that Talley
did not apply to anonymous election campaign literature. In upholding
the federal disclosure statute,88 the court said that it was valid for
Congress to pass this statute so that
the electorate would be informed and make its own appraisal
of the reason or reasons why a particular candidate was being
supported or opposed by individuals or groups. Is there any-
thing sinister in requiring disclosure of identity to the end
that voters may use their ballots intelligently ?6o
State courts have also considered whether Talley is applicable to
election laws. In Canon v. Justice Court,7" the California Supreme Court
held that Talley did not apply to election literature. The court reasoned
that the California legislature passed the disclosure statute to achieve
three ends, to enable the electorate to evaluate the competence and
credibility of the source, to deter irresponsible attacks and to enable candi-
dates to effectively rebut and refute charges. The court stated: "It is
clear that the integrity of elections, essential to the very preservation of
a free society, is a matter 'in which the state may have a compelling
regulatory concern.' "71 The Idaho Supreme Court also considered Talley
in its examination of the Idaho disclosure statute"2 in State v. Barney.78
The court held that the statute in question was "subject to several
varying and conflicting constructions""4 and was therefore unconstitu-
tionally vague. At the same time, however, the court distinguished
Talley 5 and recognized the "important policy considerations behind"7 "
disclosure statutes. It would seem, therefore, absent a Supreme Court
decision extending Talley, that the Idaho court would uphold a more con-
cisely drawn statute.
67. 195 F. Supp. 440 (D.N.D. 1961).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 612 (1966).
69. 195 F. Supp. at 443.
70. 61 Cal. 2d 446, 393 P.2d 428, 39 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1964).
71. Id. at 452-53, 393 P.2d at 431, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 231, quoting Gibson v. Florida
Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963). It should be noted that the court
in Canon did find that the California disclosure statute (CAL. ELECTIONS CODE § 12047
(West 1961)) was unconstitutional because it discriminated against non-voters by
requiring the name and address of a "voter." The California legislature promptly
changed "voter" to "person" to remedy this failing. See CAL. ELEcTIONS CODE § 12047
(West Supp. 1971).
72. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-104 (1963).
73. 92 Idaho 581, 448 P.2d 195 (1968).
74. Id. at 584, 448 P.2d at 198.
75. Id. at 586 n.6, 448 P2d at 200 n.6.
76. Id. at 586, 448 P.2d at 200.
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One court has held that Talley was applicable to anonymous election
campaign literature. In Zwickler v. Koota,77 a three-judge federal district
court struck down the New York disclosure statute7 8 as an unconstitu-
tional abridgement of freedom of speech. The court's reasoning seemed
clearly to be based on the theory that speech is an absolute and that no
restriction on it could be valid. The court said "[t]he tide of judicial
thinking floods too strongly today in the estuary of First Amendment
freedom for any tributary of government power in its exercise to over-
bear it."7
19
This decision was reversed by the Supreme Court on the ground
that the case was moot."0 The Court, however, was very careful to state
that no comment was being made on the merits of the case.8 '
So far only the Zwickler court has held that disclosure statutes per
sese are unconstitutional. Talley, despite its broad language, made no
mention of election laws or election campaign literature. The ordinance
involved in that case prohibited all anonymous circulars. When limited
to the context of election campaigns, the disclosure requirement is a very
minimal restriction on freedom of speech, considering that the policy
arguments in favor of such restrictions are strong. In Canon v. Justice
Court,8" Judge Peters argued
[i]t was not the aim of the legislature to hinder the com-
munication of ideas, and there is nothing to indicate that
the disclosure requirement . . . would in fact substantially
inhibit expression, even in the limited area to which the
statute is applicable. It was intended to deter the scurrilous hit
and run smear attacks which are all too common in the course
of political campaigns. The primary concern is not for the
candidate . . . . The chief harm is suffered by all the
people.83
77. 290 F. Supp. 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
78. This provision is now found as N.Y. ELEcTIoN LAW § 457 (McKinney Supp.
1970).
79. 290 F. Supp. at 257.
80. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969).
81. Id. at 106. Mr. Zwickler wanted to distribute anonymous campaign literature
directed against a Congressman who retired from office while the suit was still pending.
Zwickler spent a considerable amount of time in court fighting this law. Chron-
ologically the cases are People v. Zwiclder, 16 N.Y.2d 1069, 213 N.E.2d 140, 213 N.E.2d
467 (1964); Zwickler v. Koota, 261 F. Supp. 1985 (E.D.N.Y. 1965), revd, 389 U.S.
241 (1966); Zwickler v. Koota, 290 F. Supp. 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd sub nom.
Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969).
82. 61 Cal. 2d 446, 393 P.2d 428, 39 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1964). See note 70 supra
and accompanying text.
83. Id. at 453, 393 P.2d at 431-32, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 231-32.
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Disclosure provisions do not regulate the content of expression nor
do they prevent the dissemination of ideas. The basic requirement
(although it is phrased differently in various statutes) is that campaign
literature identify the person who is responsible for it. In an election
campaign the candidate must identify himself, and the campaign worker
cannot be anonymous as he passes out campaign literature. Why then
should the person responsible for literature claim a unique right to be
anonymous? It is difficult to see how disclosure statutes infringe in any
real sense on anyone's rights.
In the hypothetical that began this note, a circular was distributed
which, on its face, might be considered to be highly complimentary to
the incumbent. But because of the neighborhood in which it was distri-
buted, it could have been damaging to his candidacy. This is precisely
the kind of attack that a disclosure statute is designed to prevent. The
content of the circular was legitimate but the form was not. Should not
the voters who received the circular be informed of the source of the
information? Should not the candidate know the source in order to make
some reply to it?
It is difficult to imagine why an individual would object to putting
his name on a legitimate piece of campaign literature. The anonymous
circular in most instances will be a "gutter flyer"-a smear attack. Such
smear attacks will be less likely to be circulated and will be less effective
if the sponsor must identify himself.
In the context of an election campaign, disclosure statutes may well
tend not to restrict, but to aid in the dissemination of ideas. By knowing
its source, the voter may be better able to evaluate and question the con-
tent of literature. The candidate will be better able to respond to the
charges contained in the literature. Therefore, the statutes act to improve
the overall quality of ideas advanced in the campaign "marketplace" to
the ultimate benefit of the voter.
Thus, a state should be allowed to require that all election campaign
literature and advertising bear, at least, the name of the individual or
committee responsible for it. The name of the candidate in whose behalf
the advertising is being circulated should also be contained in all campaign
literature. To further strengthen such provisions, the use of fictitious
names or "dummy" committees should be proscribed. These are minimal
restrictions supported by strong policy considerations.
FALSE CAMPAIGN STATEMENTS
Fifteen states have sections in their election laws providing penalties
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for making false campaign statements.8 4 There are substantial variations
from state to state, but they can be broken down into two main classi-
fications. The first type simply prohibits "false campaign statements,"
while the second type 'is concerned with attacks on the morality, honesty
or integrity of a candidate.
Wisconsin's statute is an example of the first type:
No person, firm or corporation shall knowingly make or cause
to be published, any false statement in relation to any candidate,
which statement is intended or tends to affect the voting at
any primary or election."
Five states 6 (two of which also have statutes of the first type87 )
have "Political Criminal Libel" statutes. Four of these statutes make
such offense a felony.88 An example is Oregon's statute:
No letter, circular, poster, bill, publication or placard shall
contain any false statement or charges reflecting on any can-
didate's character, morality or integrity. The author and every
person knowingly assisting in the circulation of the matter
described in this section shall be guilty of a felony.89
The two types of statutes cited above are intended to control criticism
of public officials and political candidates during political campaigns.
Although the Supreme Court has not dealt with a case arising out of one
of these statutes, the general subject of criticism of public officials has
been dealt with in the Court's recent decisions concerning libel suits
brought by public officials.
The New York Times Doctrine
In New York Times v. Sullivan,"0 the Supreme Court reversed a
civil libel judgment. The Court said that "debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust and wide-open, and that it may well include
vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on public
84. It should be noted that some states do have criminal libel statutes as part
of their penal codes. The constitutionality of these statutes is questionable at the
present time. See Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966) ; Garrison v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 64 (1964).
85. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 12.17 (1967).
86. Alaska, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana and Oregon.
87. Alaska and Oregon.
8& Michigan makes it a misdemeanor. Micw. STAT. ANN. § 168.915 (1967).
89. ORE. REv. STAT. § 260.370 (1969).
90. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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officials."91 The Court held that a public official could not recover
damages for "defamatory falsehoods relating to his official conduct
unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not." 2 Justice Black would have gone even further. "An
unconditional right to say what one pleases about public affairs is what I
consider to be the minimum guarantee of the First Amendment."9 The
New York Times holding has been extended to statements made about
minor appointive officeholders94 and other "public figures, "" and has
been applied in criminal libel prosecutions. 8
St. Amant v. Thompson" involved a civil libel suit arising out of
a campaign speech. The defendant was a candidate for public office who
allegedly libeled another public official. In reversing the state court
judgment for plaintiff, the Supreme Court held that the New York Times
formula of reckless disregard for truth
is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would
have published, or would have investigated before publishing.
There must have been sufficient evidence to permit the con-
clusion that the defendant entertained serious doubts as to the
truth or falsity of his publication.9"
Justices Black and Douglas have suggested eliminating the law
of libel entirely with regard to public figures.99 The present state of the
law would still permit a candidate for public office to win a libel suit if
he can somehow convince a jury that the defendant entertained "serious
doubts" about the truth or falsity of his statement.
The New York Times Doctrine Questioned"'0
Although most observers agree that New York Times was a
91. Id. at 270.
92. Id. at 279-80.
93. Id. at 297 (Black, J., concurring).
94. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
95. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
96. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
97. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
98. Id. at 731.
99. See the concurring opinions in New York Times Iv. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
293 (1964) and Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 88 (1966).
100. Most of the ideas in this section were taken from A. RosE, LIBEr. AND
AcADEMIC FREEDOM 106-28 (1969). This very thoughtful book concerns a libel suit
brought by Professor Rose. It has particular relevance to this discussion because Rose
was both a University of Minnesota professor of sociology and a practicing politician.
He was a liberal member of the Minnesota State House of Representatives (whose
members are elected without party designation). He won his libel suit at the trial
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necessary decision, doubts have been expressed as to whether the Court
may have gone too far.
[H]ave we reached the wisest balance between the interest
in reputation and the interest in free debate? To be sure the
press must be protected against half-million dollar libel judg-
ments for minor inaccuracies that cause no demonstrable harm,
as in the New York Times case. But full and free public
discussion is a two-way street; those who contemplate entering
the arena of political debate may themselves be deterred if the
law leaves them virtually remediless against personal calumny.'
It has been argued that New York Times went far beyond protection
of speech and stripped the public official of the capacity to defend himself
against any sort of a false accusation. It has always been difficult to win
a libel suit, and New York Times has made it virtually impossible.
Justice Fortas dissented in St. Amant v. Thompson, stating that
[t]he First Amendment is not so fragile that it requires us
to immunize this kind of reckless, destructive invasion of the
life, even of public officials, heedless of their interests and
sensitivities. The First Amendment is not a shelter for the
character assassinator. . . . The First Amendment does not
require that we license shotgun attacks on public officials in
virtually unlimited open season." 2
While New York Times does pose a threat to the public official,
it poses a further threat to the public. First, as has been indicated above, 3
responsible citizens may be deterred from entering the political arena.
Secondly, the wording of the decision does not encourage investigation.
To the contrary, New York Times clearly rewards lack of investigation,
since someone who has never bothered to check his story will probably
not entertain "serious doubts" about its accuracy. Thus, responsible
debate may be curtailed. Thirdly, the corrupt public official who is
criticized by an opponent can hide behind the law, saying, "These attacks
are absolutely false and libelous; but the Supreme Court has made it
court level, but the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed in Rose v. Koch, 278 Min. 235,
154 N.W.2d 409 (1967), on the basis of New York Times. Many observers felt that
this case should have been appealed to the United States Supreme Court with the
hope that some balance could be restored to the law of libel. Unfortunately, Professor
Rose died before further appeal could be commenced.
101. Freund, Foreword to A. RosE, LIBEL AND ACADEMIC FREEDoM at vii (1969).
102. 390 U.S. at 734 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
103. See note 101 supra and accompanying text.
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impossible for me to sue." No longer can such an official be told to
"put up or shut up." It would seem, at the very least, that a full-dress
court trial would enhance free and open debate on public issues far more
than would a slugging match in the columns of the daily newspaper.
Finally, attention should be given to the "absolutist" view that has
been advanced by Justice Black. He has written: "I simply believe that
'Congress shall make no law' means Congress shall make no law."' °4
In his concurring opinion in New York Times, he stated that he believes
that the Constitution grants "the press an absolute immunity for criticism
of the way public officials do their public duty."' 5 It has been argued that
the flaw in the "absolutist" position is that it may well destroy the right
that it seeks to protect. One.critic argues that "[a]ny absolute right-
which is so extreme as to permit of no exception under any circumstances
-will eventually destroy itself, for it is open to absolute abuse."'0 8
Another writer has observed that the old cliche about the corrupting
influence of power is not completely accurate.
It is immunity that corrupts; absolute immunity corrupts
absolutely. I need very little power to be a force for unlimited
destruction-if I am absolutely immune.'
The underlying belief of both writers is that an absolute right will
destroy itself because of abuse. However, only time and future decisions
of the Court will determine whether the trend toward absolute immunity
to say what one desires will result in abuses so flagrant that the basic
freedom of speech is placed in jeopardy.
New York Times and Election Campaign Laws
Totally apart from policy considerations of whether New York
Times and its progeny are headed in the wisest direction, it is suggested
that the general law of libel not be applied to election laws forbidding
false campaign statements. Different interests are involved in these two
situations. Only the individual parties are directly concerned with the
outcome of a libel suit. The public's interest in honest elections should
be of primary consideration where violations of election laws are con-
cerned.
In an election campaign it is vital that there be "uninhibited, robust
104. H. BLAcx, A CONSTITTIONAL FAITH 45 (1969).
105. 376 U.S. at 717 (Black, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
106. A. RoSE, LIBEL AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM 115 (1969).
107. J. CAMPBELL, Constitution for Utopia, in COLLECnE EDrroRIALS PROM ANALOG
187 (1966).
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and wide-open" debate on the issues. It is obvious that in the course of a
heated election campaign attacks will get "caustic" and "vehement."
But the public interest demands that debate be responsible-that campaign
statements discuss the issues honestly. This interest, more than any
other, must be protected.
As stated previously, the Supreme Court has not yet considered a
case arising from a violation of one of the statutes providing penalties
for using false campaign statements. Federal courts have, however, upheld
legislation requiring high standards of accuracy in two types of "cam-
paign" situations not involving elections to public office, corporate proxy
fights"8 and union representation elections. 0 9 Recently, the Supreme
Court rejected an employer's claim that the National Labor Relations
Board regulations violated the employer's right of free speech. In NLRB
v. Gissell Packing Co.,"' the Court said that an employer's right of free
speech "cannot outweigh the equal rights of the employees to associate
freely." '111 Applying this reasoning to a political campaign, it might be
argued by analogy that an individual's right of free speech cannot out-
weigh the voter's right to an honest and responsible discussion of the
issues. The Court might not accept this analogy, however, since in
Gissell a union election was distinguished from a public election because
of the employer-employee relationship.112 Although it is not clear what
value Gissell would have as a precedent in a case arising out of a public
election, it is interesting to note that Justice Black (despite his absolutist
views) did not dissent from the decision.113
Most of the statutes prohibiting false campaign statements do comply
either expressly or by implication with the current New York Times
doctrine. For example, the Wisconsin statute 1 4 has three elements: 1)
the statement must have been false; 2) the person making the statement
must have known it was false; and 3) the statement must have been
intended to or did influence voting at an election. Washington's statute
uses the phrase "knowingly and willfully making false statements."1 5
North Carolina uses the New York Times formula: "knowing such
108. 2 F. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 916-24 (2d ed. 1961).
109. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. REv. 38 (1964).
110. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
111. Id. at 617.
112. Id. at 617-18.
113. For further discussion of this point see Case Comment, 5 VA.. U.L. Rxv.
178, 183 (1970).
114. See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
115. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 29.85.070 (1965).
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report to be false or with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. 1 18 The
element of knowledge is also implicit in the Oregon Political Criminal
Libel statute.
117
The Montana Political Criminal Libel statute,"' however, appears
to be in conflict with the standard announced in St. Amant v. Thomp-
son. ' In St. Amant, the Court held that the defendant must have had
serious doubts about the truth of his statement in order for that statement
to be actionable. The Montana statue requires the defendant to show
that he had reasonable grounds to believe that his statement was true.
The Mississippi statute goes beyond this and places the burden on the
defendant to prove the truth of his statement.'
Other than the Mississippi statute, the provisions discussed in this
section are reasonable attempts to require a factual basis for campaign
statements rather than an infringement on freedom of expression. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that the statement must be false and
that it must be a statement "of fact, not conclusions or opinions."'' The
Minnesota Supreme Court, in interpreting that state's statute, 22 has
stated:
The corrupt practices statute is directed against false statements
of fact. It does not forbid criticism of a candidate, even
though unfair and unjust, if based on facts which are not false. 8
These statutes do allow the "uninhibited, robust and wide-open" debate
that the Supreme Court wanted to encourage with New York Times.
Criticism of a candidate and expression of strong opinions are not
forbidden. The statutes simply require a minimum standard of factual
accuracy.
Applying these considerations in the context of the introductory
hypothetical election, it is clear that these statutes do not prohibit
"vehement" or "caustic" attacks. The charges that the incumbent was
a "tool" of the downtown business interests and that the challenger could
not make his own decisions are clearly opinions. While the criticism in
both cases may have been unfair, it would not have violated the law.
116. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-274(8) (Supp. 1969).
117. See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
118. MONT. REv. ConEs ANN. § 94-1454 (1965).
119. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
120. Miss. CODE ANN. § 3174 (1956).
121. State ex rel. Skibinski v. Tadych, 31 Wis. 2d 189, 193, 142 N.W.2d 838, 840
(1966).
122. Currently MINN. STAT. ANN. § 210.11 (Supp. 1971).
123. Bank v. Egan, 240 Minn. 192, 194, 60 N.W.2d 257, 259 (1953).
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Should the Candidate Have a Duty to Investigate?
Perhaps the practical flaw in these statutes is not that they are too
restrictive, but that they do not go far enough. Under these statutes,
an individual is prohibited from making statements that he knows are
false, but he is not required to make any investigation before making a
charge. It is submitted that the candidate and his campaign committee
should be held to a higher standard. They should be required to make a
reasonable investigation before making a statement or printing a cam-
paign brochure.
The need for this requirement arises from the nature of the American
voter. He is not primarily concerned with politics.124 He cannot be
expected to make an independent investigation of every candidate and
every issue. To an extent, he must rely on the presentations of the
candidates. For example, the challenger in the hypothetical election
claimed that the incumbent had voted in favor of a real estate tax increase.
As a practical matter, few voters would have access to city council records
to find out how Alderman Kinley actually did vote. Considering another
of the charges, the average voter would not know how to find out
whether Alderman Kinley had been "hauled into court for beating his
wife." It is submitted that because a voter usually has neither the
resources nor the time to investigate campaign statements, he should be
able to rely on them to have at least some basis in fact. The candidate
and his campaign committee, therefore, should be required to make a
reasonable investigation before making a campaign statement.
Creating An Informed Electorate
The candidate's primary purpose in waging his campaign is to win.
But an election campaign should be something more than a mud-slinging
brawl or a beauty contest. Responsible debate during a campaign can
serve to inform and educate the voter. Each voter, therefore, has a vital
interest in clean elections. He has a right to expect that debate be
"uninhibited, robust and wide-open." He has an equally important right
to demand that the debate be responsible, for only then can he make a
rational choice. Statutes of the kind discussed in this section cannot
guarantee a clean, hard-fought campaign, but they can help to create an
atmosphere in which the electorate expects and demands one.
SANCTIONS
Generally, violations of the statutes discussed in this note are made
124. R. SCAMMON & B. WATTENBERG, THE REAL MAJORITY 225-29 (1970).
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misdemeanors." 5 The penalties provide for fines or for forfeiture of the
office to which the violator was elected. Under some statutes, the
candidate may also be barred from running for election to the vacancy
created by his being ousted from office. Obviously, the real "teeth" in the
the law are not the fines but the forfeiture provisions.'
The constitutionality of barring a successful candidate from taking
office because of violations of election law has not been questioned. While
the Supreme Court has considered the problem of whether an elected
official can be barred from office, in Bond v. Floyd.2 and Powell v.
McCormick,2 ' in neither of those cases was the official barred because
of violations of election laws. Therefore, though the subject matter of the
cases suggests that they might be applicable to the problem at hand,
consideration of the basis for the decisions indicates otherwise.'29
Each state has its own procedure for handling a challenged election.
The Oregon statute provides that the nomination or election of any
person to office may be challenged by any person who was a candidate for
that office or by "any elector entitled to vote for such person."' 80 The
grounds for such a contest are as follows:
(1) Deliberate and material violations of any provision
of the election laws in connection with such nomination,
125. Occasionally, a situation might arise where there is a continuing violation.
In California, a court has issued a restraining order and injunction to stop an unfair
campaign practice under a statute that authorized the issuance of an injunction to
prevent an act amounting to unfair competition. Democratic State Central Committee
v. Committee for the Preservation of the Democratic Party in California, No. 526150
(Super. Ct. San Francisco, California). This case is discussed in G. O'Gara, Unfair
Election Campaign Practices in 15 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1, 20-21 (1968).
126. In England the penalties are even more severe. When British laws similar
to American corrupt campaign practice acts are violated, the candidate (if elected)
forfeits his office, and both he and his agent (campaign manager) are barred from
any participation in political campaigns for five years! R. HOLT & J. TURNER, POLITICAL
PARTIES IN ACTION 41 (1968).
127. 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
128. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
129. Julian Bond was refused his seat in the Georgia legislature because of his
anti-war views and because other members of the Georgia legislature doubted his
loyalty. The Supreme Court held that the legislature could not refuse to seat Bond
on those grounds. His criticism of national foreign policy was protected by the first
amendment, and, therefore, his views could not be used as grounds for barring him
from his seat.
Congressman Adam Clayton Powell was "excluded" from his position because of
misconduct in office. The basis of the Court's decision in Powell was that Congress
did not have the power to "exclude" a duly elected congressman. Congress has the
power to "expel" a member by a two-thirds vote, according to the Court, but not to
"exclude" him by a majority vote.
Thus, neither Bond nor Powell dealt with the question of a court or legislature
barring an individual from taking office because of violations of election laws.
130. Omto Rxv. STAT. § 251.025 (1969).
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election, approval or rejection.
(2) Ineligibility of the person elected to hold the office
at the time of his election.
(3) Illegal votes.
(4) Mistake or fraud in the canvas of votes.
(5) Fraud in the count of votes.'
Under Oregon law, an election contest must be begun by filing a
"petition of contest with the clerk of the circuit court" not later than
ten days after the final canvas of votes is completed. "' The statute
further provides that the judge will hear the case without a jury, but
otherwise the practice and procedure is the same as in a normal civil
case. " ' Wisconsin's procedure is similar to Oregon's except that the
defendant may have a jury trial. "4
The procedures indicated above are the normal way that an election
contest is handled unless the contest is over a legislative office. Most
state constitutions have provisions that make the legislature judge of its
own elections, " similar to the constitutional provisions that make
Congress judge of its own elections.3"' Probably the most common
procedure applying to legislature contests is that used by Wisconsin
and Minnesota.3 7 A regular court proceeding is held, but the judge makes
no findings of fact. He simply transmits the entire record to the legisla-
ture which then determines whether the candidate should be barred
from office. Thus, the court is used as a fact-finding agency, while the
ultimate power of judgment is reserved by the legislature.
Courts (and presumably legislatures) have generally taken the
position that forfeiture of office should be reserved for serious violations
of election laws.
A violation . . . must be deliberate, willful and substantial.
The remedy of ouster is not available for insubstantial or
technical violations which would not affect the result of the
election, nor is the law intended to be a trap for the innocent
or unwary candidate. 3 '
131. Id.
132. Id. at § 251.045.
133. Id. at § 251.070.
134. State v. Markham, 160 Wis. 431, 152 N.W. 161 (1915).
135. Annot., 17 L. Ed. 2d 911, 915 (1967).
136. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 5.
137. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 209.02 (1962); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 12.23 (1967).
138. State ex rel. Skibinski v. Tadych, 31 Wis. 2d 189, 193, 142 N.W.2d 838, 840
(1966).
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Forfeiture of office may be a drastic penalty, but it is a necessary
one. In the first place, the threat of a small fine, or even of a large one,
will not serve as much of a deterrent to unfair campaign practices when
public office is at stake. A fine would just be considered another campaign
expense. Secondly, an election which has been preceded by serious viola-
tions of election laws must have been affected in some way by those
violations. To an extent, it does not, therefore, represent the free choice
of the voters and should be voided.
CONCLUSION
The 1844 Presidential election between Democrat James K. Polk
and Whig Henry Clay added a new term to the political lexicon. Just be-
fore the election, the Ithaca, New York, Chronicle published an extract
from an account by one Baron Roorback entitled "A Tour Through the
Western and Southern States."
The good baron told of watching the purchase of forty-three
slaves by James K. Polk, "the present Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the mark of the branding iron and the initials
of his name, on their shoulders distinguishing them ... "
Though the election was at hand, other newspapers that
shared the Chronicle's Whig leanings found time to reprint this
report of the Democrat's inhumanity. In actual fact, the sale was
never made, the branding scene never took place, and there was
no Baron Roorback. Polk won, but the deception hurt his
cause. The word Roorback became a common noun, known to
generation after generation of political practitioners and
students: roorback, noun, any false or damaging story about
a political candidate published too late in a campaign to permit
effective rebuttal.'
The term "roorback" has faded from common usage, but the tactic,
along with the "gutter flyer," ' ° political "dynamiting" ' and other
forms of "dirty" politics, is still very much present on the political scene.
While the statutory provisions that have been discussed in this
note do serve to protect the candidate, they serve in a much more
important way as a "consumer protection" device for the voter. V. 0.
Key, Jr. has written:
139. B. FELKNOR, DIRTY POLITICS 25 (1966).
140. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
141. See F. Jonas, The Art of Political Dynamiting, 10 WEST. POL. Q., June,
1957, at 388.
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The voice of the people is but an echo. The output of the echo
chamber bears an inevitable and invariable relation to the
input. As candidates and parties clamor for attention and vie
for popular support, the people's verdict can be no more than
a selective reflection from among the alternatives and outlooks
presented to them. Even the most discriminating popular judg-
ment can reflect on ambiguity, uncertainty, or even foolishness
if those are the qualities of the input into the echo chamber.'42
State election laws reflect the values of the electorate. If one state's
electorate demands a higher standard of accuracy and fair play from
politicians, it should be their right to do so. As Justice Clark wrote:
"No civil right has a greater claim to constitutional protection or calls
for more rigorous safeguarding than voting rights."'43 These statutes,
however imperfect, are a valid means of protecting that right.
142. V.0. KEY, JR., THE RESPONSIBLE ELECTORATE 2-3 (1966).
143. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 70 (1960) (Clark, J., dissenting).
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